On the Nature of Fair Behavior by Falk, Armin et al.
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich
Working Paper Series
ISSN 1424-0459
forthcoming in: “Economic Inquiry”
Working Paper No. 17
On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher
August 1999
  
 
On the Nature of Fair Behavior* 
 
Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher 
University of Zurich∗∗ 
 
Revised Version: August 1999 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically 
different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. 
This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility 
of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of 
alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully 
captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution 
of material payoffs. Models that take into account players’ fairness intentions and 
distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively 
on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not. 
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1. Introduction 
There is by now considerable evidence that fairness considerations affect economic 
behavior in many important areas. In bilateral bargaining situations anonymously 
interacting agents frequently agree on rather egalitarian outcomes although the standard 
model with purely selfish preferences predicts rather unequal outcomes (Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982, Roth 1995, Camerer and Thaler 1995). In competitive 
experimental labor markets with incomplete contracts, fairness considerations give rise to 
efficiency wage effects that generate stable deviations from the perfectly competitive 
outcome (Fehr and Falk 1999). In several questionnaire studies (e.g. Bewley 1995, 
Campbell and Kamlani 1997) personal managers indicate that despite an excess supply of 
labor, firms are unwilling to cut wages because they fear that pay cuts are perceived as 
unfair and hostile by the workers and will, hence, destroy work morale. In principal-agent 
relationships reciprocally fair behavior causes a considerable increase in the set of 
enforceable contracts and, hence, large efficiency gains (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 
1997). To examine the forces that affect the perceptions of fairness and the determinants 
of fair behavior is, thus, not just of philosophical or academic interest.  
A common feature of fair behavior in the above cited situations is, that in response 
to an act of party A that is favorable for party B, B is willing to take costly actions to 
return at least part of the favor (positive reciprocity), and in response to an act that is 
perceived as harmful by B, B is willing to take costly actions to reduce A’s material 
payoff (negative reciprocity). This suggests that reciprocal behavior is an important 
component of fairness-driven behavior. Reciprocally fair behavior has been shown to 
prevail in one-shot situations and under rather high stake levels (Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe 1995, Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir 1991, Cameron 1995).  
In this paper, we show that identical offers in an ultimatum game trigger vastly 
different rejection rates depending on the other offers available to the proposer. In 
particular, a given offer with an unequal distribution of material payoffs is much more 
likely to be rejected if the proposer could have proposed a more equitable offer than if the 
proposer could have proposed only more unequal offers. Thus, it is not just the material 
payoff consequence of an offer that determines the acceptance but the set of available, yet 
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not chosen, offers is also decisive. This result not only casts serious doubt on the 
consequentialist practice in standard economic theory that defines the utility of an action 
solely in terms of the consequences of this action. It also shows that the recently 
developed models of fairness by Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) and Fehr and 
Schmidt (forthcoming) are incomplete to the extent that they neglect 
"nonconsequentialist" reasons for reciprocally fair actions. These models assume that – in 
addition to their material self-interest - people also value the distributive consequences of 
outcomes. The impressive feature of these models is that they are capable of predicting 
correctly a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. For example: Why do 
competitive experimental markets with complete contracts typically converge to the 
predictions of the “selfish model” while in bilateral bargaining situations or in markets 
with incomplete contracts stable deviations in the direction of more equitable outcomes 
are the rule. However, despite their predictive success in important areas, our results 
indicate that there remain legitimate doubts whether these models capture the 
phenomenon of reciprocal fairness in a fully satisfactory way.  
A parsimonious interpretation of our results, which is also suggested by 
psychological research, can be given in terms of “intentions”.1 Identical actions by the 
proposer are – depending on the available alternatives – likely to signal different 
information about the intentions of the proposer. Hence, if responders do not only take 
into account the distributive consequences of the proposers' actions but also the fairness of 
the proposers' intentions, their responses to identical offers may differ. Viewed from this 
perspective, our results suggest that fairness models should not only take into account that 
many people have preferences over the distribution of payoffs but also that many people 
value the fairness intentions behind actions. Models like this have been suggested by 
Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998). However, as we will see, the 
recognition that intentions are important is not sufficient to account for our evidence 
because distributive concerns are important as well. Ultimately, it needs a model which 
combines both, preferences for distributive consequences and the role of intentions. An 
attempt in this direction is made by Falk and Fischbacher (1998).  
                                                           
1
 For a review of the psychological literature see Krebs (1970). 
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Before we present our experimental examination in detail, we would like to 
emphasize that the attribution of intentions for the evaluation of actions is not restricted to 
laboratory studies. We believe that it is also important in many real life situations. Take 
for instance the case that your neighbor caused a small damage at your car either 
intentionally or because of insufficient care. Most people would consider the intentionally 
caused damage as the more serious offence. Another important real life example that 
illustrates the importance of the attribution of intentions is the criminal law. It 
distinguishes carefully between criminal activities that are committed negligently and 
those committed with criminal intent. Similar distinctions are also made in the 
commercial law and the labor law. The punishment associated with a failure to meet 
obligations is, in general, dependent on judgments about the intention that caused the 
violation. 
In the next section we describe our experimental design. Section 3 presents the 
results. The final section relates our findings to the literature and draws implications for 
theoretical modeling. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
To examine whether identical offers trigger different rejection rates depending on the 
alternatives available to the proposer, we conducted four so-called mini-ultimatum games. 
Each of 90 experimental subjects participated in all four games. The mini-ultimatum 
games were extremely simple and share the same structure (see Figures 1a-d). In all 
games the proposer P is asked to divide 10 points between himself and the responder R, 
who can either accept or reject the offer. Accepting the offer leads to a payoff distribution 
according to the proposer’s offer. A rejection implies zero payoffs for both players. 
As Figures 1a-d indicate, P can choose between two allocations, x and y. In all four 
games the allocation x is the same while the allocation y (the “alternative” to x) differs 
from game to game. If P chooses x and R accepts this offer, P gets 8 points while R 
receives 2 points. In game (a) the alternative offer y is (5/5). This game is therefore called 
the (5/5)-game. Game (b) is called the (2/8)-game because the alternative offer y is to 
keep 2 points and to give 8 points to R. In game (c) P has in fact no alternative at all, i.e., 
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he is forced to propose an offer (8/2). We call it the (8/2)-game. Finally, in game (d) the 
alternative offer is (10/0), hence it is termed (10/0)-game. In order to get sufficient data 
we employed the strategy method. Every responder had to indicate his action at both 
decision nodes, i.e., for the case of an x- and for the case of a y-offer, without knowing 
what P had proposed. 
At the beginning subjects were randomly assigned the P- or the R-role and they kept 
this role in all four games. Subjects faced the games in a random order and in each game 
they played against a different anonymous opponent. They were informed about the 
outcome of all four games, i.e., about the choice of their opponents, only after they had 
made their decision in all games. This procedure not only avoids income effects. It also 
rules out that subjects’ behavior is influenced by previous decisions of their opponents. 
After the end of the fourth game subjects received a show-up fee of CHF 10.- plus their 
earnings from the experiment. For each point earned they received CHF -.80 so that in all 
four games together CHF 32.- (about $23) were at stake. The experiment lasted 
approximately 40 minutes. It was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 1998). 
Figure 1: The mini ultimatum games 
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3. Predictions and Results 
Since we are mainly interested in the variations of responders’ behavior across the four 
games we shortly present the responder-predictions of the various models. The standard 
model with selfish preferences predicts that in all games the allocation (8/2) is never 
rejected. The Bolton-Ockenfels and the Fehr-Schmidt-model predict that the rejection rate 
of the (8/2)-offer is the same across all games. Since these models capture people’s 
dislike for inequality, they are consistent with positive rejection rates. However, since 
they disregard that identical outcomes may be perceived as more or less fair, depending on 
the alternatives available to the first mover, they are not consistent with different rejection 
rates of the (8/2)-offer across the four games.  
Intuitively, one would expect that in the (5/5)-game a proposal of (8/2) is clearly 
perceived as unfair because P could have proposed the egalitarian offer (5/5). In the (2/8)-
game offering (8/2) may still be perceived as unfair but probably less so than in the (5/5)-
game because the only alternative available to (8/2) gives P much less than R. In a certain 
sense, therefore, P has an excuse for not choosing (2/8) because one cannot 
unambiguously infer from his unwillingness to propose an unfair offer to himself that he 
wanted to be unfair to the responder. Thus, we would expect that the rejection rate of the 
(8/2)-offer in the (5/5)-game is higher than in the (2/8)-game. In the (8/2)-game P has no 
choice at all so that P’s behavior cannot be judged in terms of fairness. Responders can 
only judge the fairness of the outcome (8/2) and if they exhibit sufficient aversion against 
inequality they will reject this distribution of money. The rejection rate in the (8/2)-game 
measures, therefore, subjects’ pure aversion against disadvantageous inequality. Since any 
attribution of unfairness to P’s behavior is ruled out here we expect an even lower 
rejection rate compared to the (2/8)-game. Finally, offering (8/2) in the (10/0)-game may 
even be perceived as a fair (or less unfair) action so that the rejection rate of (8/2) is likely 
to be lowest in this game.  
Figure 2 presents our main result. The bars represent the percentage of responders 
that reject the (8/2)-offer in the different games. The rejection rate in the (5/5)-game is 
highest (44.4 percent). 26.7 percent rejected the (8/2)-offer in the (2/8)-game, 18 percent 
in the (8/2)-game and 8.9 percent in the (10/0)-game. The non-parametric McNemar-test 
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confirms that the differences in rejection rates between the (5/5)-game and each of the 
other games is statistically significant (p<.022). The same test also confirms a significant 
difference between the (2/8)- and the (8/2)-game while the difference between the (8/2) 
and the (10/0)-game is not significant.2 
These results indicate that pure aversion against inequality plays a role because 18 
percent of responders reject the (8/2)-offer when P has no choice. This is evidence against 
pure intentions models like those of Rabin and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger. However, 
the results also clearly reject the implication of the Bolton-Ockenfels and the Fehr-
Schmidt model that there are no differences in rejection rates across games. The rise in the 
rejection rate from 18 to roughly 45 percent in the (5/5)-game suggests that intentions-
driven reciprocal behavior is a major factor.  
 
Figure 2
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 The rejection rates of the alternative offers (5/5), (2/8) and (10/0) are as follows. Nobody 
rejected the (5/5)-offer and only one subject rejected the (2/8)-offer. Almost 90 percent rejected 
the offer (10/0).  
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Finally, we take a look at proposers’ behavior. Given the varying acceptance rates of 
the (8/2)-offers it is an interesting question whether proposers anticipated the differences 
in acceptance rates. Put differently, we can ask whether proposers realize that, given their 
alternative offers in the different games, responders have a higher tolerance to accept the 
(8/2)-offer. This would be further support for our interpretation that the fairness of an 
action is not only assessed by the distributive outcome but also by the intention that drives 
the action. Figure 3 provides the evidence. It shows that – when moving from the (5/5)-
game to the (2/8)-game and then to the (10/0)-game – the monotonous increase in the 
acceptance rate of the (8/2)-offer is matched by a monotonous increase in the percentage 
of (8/2)-choices by the proposers.3 The McNemar test indicates that the differences in the 
frequencies of the (8/2)-proposal are highly significant (p < .001).  
Figure 3:
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 Since in the (8/2)-game proposers had no choice but to choose (8/2) such a comparison is 
meaningless for the (8/2)-game.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The results of our experiment clearly show that the same action by the proposer in a mini-
ultimatum game triggers very different responses depending on the alternative action 
available to the proposer. This suggests that responders do not only take into account the 
distributive consequences of the action by the proposer but also the intention that is 
signaled by the action. Supporting evidence for this interpretation is also provided by the 
experiments of Blount (1995)4, Brandts and Sola (1998), and Güth, Huck and Müller 
(1998).5 At a more general level our results also call into question the consequentialist 
practice in standard economic theory that defines the utility of an action solely in terms of 
the material consequences of this action. 
The pattern of rejections in our experiment indicates that both distributional 
concerns and the attribution of fairness intentions are a driving force of reciprocally fair 
behavior and that models that focus exclusively on one aspect are incomplete. Therefore, 
the equity models of Bolton and Ockenfels and Fehr and Schmidt are not fully satisfactory 
because they have no explicit role for intentions while the pure intentions models of 
Rabin and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger are incomplete because they do not capture 
distributional concerns in a satisfactory way. Models that combine both driving forces of 
reciprocal behavior seem, therefore, most promising. 
                                                           
4
 The results of Blount (1995) may be affected by the fact that subjects had to make decisions as a 
proposer and as a responder before they knew their actual roles. After subjects had made their 
decisions in both roles, the role for which they received payments was determined randomly. In 
one of Blount’s treatments deception was involved. Subjects believed that there were proposers 
although in fact the experimenters made the proposals. All subjects in this condition were 
"randomly" assigned to the responder role. 
5
 There is also evidence for the view that distributive concerns alone as well as intentions alone 
cannot explain nice actions in response to nice behavior (see Charness 1996). For a dissenting 
view see, however, Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998). 
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